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JURISDICTION
Article VIII, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution, Utah
Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of
the Utah Court of Appeals, confer jurisdiction upon this Court
to hear this appeal.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is taken from the final judgment of the Fourth
Judicial Circuit Court of Utah County, Provo Department, entered
by the Honorable E. Patrick McGuire (the "Judgment").
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Are Empire Land Title, Inc.'s ("Empire") claims, which

were brought pursuant to an assignment from Kelly Wilson ("Wilson") , barred by Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company's ("Weyerhaeuser")
affirmative defenses which were available against Wilson?
2.

Were Empire's claims barred by Utah Code Ann. Sections

78-12-25 and 26 because the Complaint was filed in excess of
four (4) years following the payment of money to Weyerhaeuser?
3.

Alternatively, if the circuit court's ruling applying

a 6-year statute of limitations is upheld, did Empire's assignor
breach its obligations under the writing (the Beneficiary Statement) , thus excusing the need for Weyerhaeuser's performance?
4.

Did Empire's failure to join Shand Morahan & Company

and P. Scott Construction Company result in the absence of real
parties in interest and/or indispensable parties under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, thus precluding the relief awarded to
Empire?

5.
offset

Was Empire's claim against Weyerhaeuser subject to an
for the amounts Wilson should have paid

Weyerhaeuser

under the Beneficiary Statement or for the fair rental value of
the property?
6.

Did Empire fail to establish its damages, if any, with

the necessary specificity?
7.

Did the circuit court err in providing an award of

attorneys1 fees expended in collecting the judgment?
PERTINENT STATUTES AND RULES
The following authorities are dispositive of the issues
herein:
a.

Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-23 (1987) provides:

78-12-23.

Within six years - Mesne profits
of real property - Instrument
in writing - Distribution of
criminal proceeds to victim.
Within six years.
(1) An action for the mesne profits of real
property.
(2) An action upon any contract, obligation,
or liability founded upon an instrument in writing,
except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22.
(3) An action instituted under Section 7811-12.5 regarding distribution of criminal proceeds
to any victim.
b.

Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25 (Supp. 1988) provides:

78-12-25.

Within four years.

Within four years:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation
or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing;
also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account;
also on an open account for work, labor or services
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rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced
at any time within four years after the last charge
is made or the last payment is received.
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action
under the following sections of Chapter 6, Title 25,
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1)(a), which in
specific situations limits the time for action to one
year, under Section 26-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(1)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1).
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
c.

Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-26 (1987) provides:

78-12-26.

Within three years.

Within three years:
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or
injury to real property; except that when waste or
trespass is committed by means of underground works
upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not
accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of
the facts constituting such waste or trespass.
(2) an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where
the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually
included in the term 'livestock1, which at the time
of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without
the owner's fault, the cause does not accrue until the
owner has actual knowledge of such facts as would put
a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of
the animal by the defendant.
(3) an action for relief on the ground of
fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action in
such case does not accrue until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake.
(4) an action for a liability created by the
statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or
forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed
by the statutes of this state.
(5) an action to enforce liability imposed
by Section 78-17-3, except that the cause of action does
3

not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or reasonably should know of the harm suffered.
d.

Utah R. Civ. P. 17 provides:

Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant.
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in
whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of
another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in
his own name without joining with him the party for
whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of
another shall be brought in the name of the state of
Utah.
No action shall be dismissed on the ground
that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest until a reasonable time has been
allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of,
the real party in interest; and such ratification,
joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect
as if the action had been commenced in the name of
the real party in interest.
e.

Utah R. Civ. P. 19 provides:

Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person
who is subject to service of process and whose joinder
will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party
in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or
(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of
the action and is so situated that the disposition of
the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by
reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been
so joined, the court shall order that he be made a
party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses
to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper
4

case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party
objects to venue and his joinder would render the
venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed
from the action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Weyerhaeuser requests that this Court reverse the circuit
court's judgment below on any or all of the grounds argued, and
that this Court remand this case to that court for dismissal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In late summer of 1982, Wilson agreed to purchase a parcel
of property in American Fork, Utah. At that time, Wilson, Empire
and Weyerhaeuser•s loan assumption department believed the property was owned by P. Scott Construction Company and that there
was a serious default respecting an underlying mortgage on the
property with Weyerhaeuser.

Empire agreed to conduct the clos-

ing on the sale, and caused a title search to be conducted on the
property.

Also, Empire requested from Weyerhaeuser's assumption

department, information respecting the amounts necessary
Wilson to assume the loan then believed to be existing.

for

Weyer-

haeuser provided a Beneficiary Statement which reflected that a
closing on the property must occur before September 15, 1982,
and

that

$5,473.04.

the

assumption

charges

on

the

mortgage

would

be

The Beneficiary Statement also provided "loan pay-

ments must be brought and kept current during the escrow as loan
activity will continue.", that payments on the property were
$213.00"per month and that the payments would be due on the
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first of every month thereafter.

It was Empire's custom and

habit to explain the significance of these obligations of payments to purchasers of property assuming mortgages, and there is
no evidence the custom and habit was not followed in this instance.

The amount of $5,473.04 was transmitted by Empire to

Weyerhaeuser, although it was not established at trial who
originally paid the money.
After receiving apparent title to the property, Wilson
allowed Bart Papworth

("Papworth") to reside on the subject

premises from September 1982 through May 1985. The fair rental
value for the premises during this period of time was $3 50.00
per month, for a total fair rental value of $11,200.00 for the
3 2 months involved.

No one made any payments to Weyerhaeuser

during this period of time.
Wilson later discovered that, unbeknownst to both Empire
and Weyerhaeuser's assumption department, the property he had
attempted to assume had, in fact, been foreclosed prior to September 1982. Wilson and his parents, Max and Sue Wilson, demanded
that Empire reimburse them for their losses as a result of the
transaction.

After some negotiations, Empire and its errors

and omissions carrier made a cash payment to Wilson, Max Wilson
and Sue Wilson in settlement of their claim.

As part of the

settlement agreement, Wilson assigned his claims against Weyerhaeuser to Empire and to Shand Morahan & Company, Empire's errors
and omissions insurance carrier.
6

Wilson's parents did not make

any assignment to Empire.

Empire thereafter made demand upon

Weyerhaeuser for repayment of the money paid to Weyerhaeuser
after the closing.

Weyerhaeuser refused to pay the money to

Empire without receiving the fair rental value or mortgage payments in return. Empire commenced this action on March 23, 1987.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The circuit court's record consists of two separate transcripts.

In this Statement of Facts, reference will be made to

the Transcript of Trial, or to the Transcript of Cross Examination of Thomas Hare ("Cross Examination Transcript").
a.

On August 26, 1982, at Empire's request, Weyerhaeuser

delivered a written Beneficiary Statement to Empire setting
forth that there was a $5,473.04 deficiency on a mortgage between Weyerhaeuser and P. Scott Construction Company which Wilson desired to assume (plaintiff's Exhibit 1; Transcript of
Trial, p. 14).
b.

The Beneficiary Statement reflected that "P. Scott

Constr. Co." was the mortgagor, that the monthly payments under
the mortgage would be $213.00, and further provided that "Loan
payments must be brought and kept current during this escrow
as loan activity will continue."

It was Empire's custom and

habit at all closings to explain to purchasers assuming loans
that the purchasers would be required to make monthly payments
on assumed loans (plaintiff's Exhibit 1; Cross Examination Transcript, p. 9) .
7

c.

At some time between their original contact with Wilson

and the closing on September 13, 1982, Empire conducted a title
search on the property.

Empire failed to discover in their

search, however, that the property had been sold at a trustee's
sale on March 26, 1982, and that a trustee's deed had been recorded in April of 1982 (Transcript of Trial, pp. 16-19 and 21;
Cross Examination Transcript, p. 10; plaintiff's Exhibit 3).
d.

At the time of closing on the attempted assumption on

September 13, 1982, the mortgage to be assumed had been previously foreclosed, unbeknownst to Weyerhaeuser's assumption department and to Empire (plaintiff's Exhibit 3; Transcript of
Trial, pp. 20-24).
e.

On September 13, 1982, Empire provided Weyerhaeuser

with a check for $5,473.04.

The voucher portion of the check,

also provided to Weyerhaeuser, made reference to P. Scott Construction Company and to the loan, but not to Wilson (plaintiff's Exhibit 2; defendant's Exhibit 7; Cross Examination Transcript, p. 18).
f.

It was not established at trial whether the money paid

to Weyerhaeuser originally came from Wilson or another (Cross
Examination Transcript, pp. 14 and 16).
g.

Subsequent to the closing, Papworth retained the use

and possession of the subject property.

Papworth remained in

possession from September 6, 1982 until May 6, 1985 (Transcript
of Trial, pp. 29-30, 38 and 73).
8

h.

The fair rental value of the property between Septem-

ber 1982 and May 1985 was stipulated by the parties to have
been $350.00 per month (Transcript of Trial, p. 43).
i.

From September 1982 through May 1985 neither Wilson,

Empire nor Papworth made any mortgage or rental payments to
Weyerhaeuser (defendant's Exhibit 14; Transcript of Trial, pp.
69-70 and 74; Cross Examination Transcript, p. 23).
j.

At some time following the closing, it was discovered

that Weyerhaeuserfs foreclosure department had previously foreclosed the mortgage intended to be assumed.

On April 12, 1984,

Empire demanded repayment of $5,473.04 from Weyerhaeuser (plaintiff's Exhibit 4; Transcript of Trial, pp. 23-28; defendant's
Exhibit 14).
k.

On April 16, 1985, Empire and its errors and omissions

insurance carrier settled with Empire's clients, Wilson, Max
Wilson and Sue Wilson (plaintiff's Exhibit 5; Transcript of Trial,
pp. 24-25; Cross Examination Transcript, pp. 5-6).
1.

Approximately one-third (1/3) of the settlement money

paid to the Wilsons was, in fact, paid by Shand Morahan & Company, Empire's errors and omissions insurance carrier.

Empire

did not establish, at trial, the amount it actually paid in the
settlement (Cross Examination Transcript, pp. 5-6).
m.

Empire's alleged rights to pursue the action arose

from a Release and Assignment of Claims dated April 16, 1985,
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which assigned only Kelly Wilson's claims (Cross Examination
Transcript, pp. 14-16; plaintiff's Exhibit 5).
n.

Wilson's tenant, Papworth, did not vacate the subject

property and return it to Weyerhaeuser until May 1985, following
a request from Weyerhaeuser (Transcript of Trial, pp. 73 and 76) .
o.

Empire's action herein was commenced on March 23, 1987,

alleging three theories of recovery:

(i) breach of agreement;

(ii) unjust enrichment; and (iii) mistake (Complaint, R. 1-3) .
p.

At trial, counsel for Empire acknowledged he was not

pursuing attorneys' fees, that there was no contractual basis
for an award of attorneys' fees, and that Weyerhaeuser' s defenses were valid and did not justify any statutory award of
attorneys' fees (Transcript of Trial, p. 99).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Weyerhaeuser appeals the circuit court's judgment in favor
of Empire.

In reviewing the facts of this case, it must be

recalled from the outset that Empire brought its claim pursuant
to an assignment from Wilson, and no one else.

Thus, Empire is

limited to those claims Wilson himself could have asserted, and
is subject to the defenses which could have been asserted against
Wilson and were asserted against Empire.
Additionally, Empire failed to pursue its action for four
and one-half years after the mistake, precluding its relief by
virtue of the applicable statutes of limitation.

Further, the

evidence at trial failed to establish that Wilson himself had
10

paid the original $5,473.04 which was the subject of the dispute.
The evidence did establish, however, that Empire's errors and
omissions insurance carrier, Shand Morahan & Company, paid approximately one-third of the settlement amount actually paid to
Wilson and his parents.

Empire, however, did not join Shand

Morahan & Company, clearly a real party in interest, as plaintiff.

Empire also failed to join the sellers or tenant of the

property who were indispensable to afford relief.
The only possible basis for the ruling of the court below
would be based upon the court's desire for restitution damages
arising from mistake. However, in assessing damages for mistake,
both parties must be placed in the position they had been in
prior to the mistake.

A prerequisite to this is that Empire

tender any benefits they (or their assignor) receive.

In this

case, it was established that Wilson's tenant, Papworth, occupied the premises from September 1982 through May 1985.

If

Empire is awarded damages under either its unjust enrichment or
mistake theory, it must first tender to Weyerhaeuser the fair
rental value of the property from September 1982 through May
1985 ($11,200.00) or the mortgage payments Wilson did not make
($6,816.00, excluding late fees and additional interest).

Wil-

son's failure to make these payments also excused Weyerhaeuser
from performing.

Finally, the court's award of attorneys' fees

in its judgment is in contravention of the claims of the parties
and the applicable law.
11

ARGUMENT
POINT I
EMPIRE IS LIMITED TO THE RIGHTS
OF ITS ASSIGNOR, WILSON, AND IS
SUBJECT TO WEYERHAEUSER1S DEFENSES.
Empire brought its claim through an assignment from Wilson,
It is "[f]undamental to the law of assignments that an assignee
take nothing more by his assignment than his assignor had."
Wiscombe v. The Lockhart Co., 608 P.2d 236

(Utah 1980).

As

such, Empire was and is subject to any defenses which Weyerhaeuser could assert against Wilson if this action had been
brought by Wilson in his own name.

It is thus apparent that

the statute of limitations, Wilson's breach respecting his required performance, and Wilson's failure or refusal to return
the benefits he received as a result of the parties' mistake,
bar any relief to Empire.

All of these affirmative defenses

are set forth more fully below.
POINT II
EMPIRE'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE
APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION.
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25 (Supp. 1988) provides that
actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities not founded
upon instruments of writing must be commenced within four (4)
years.

Alternatively, Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-26

(1987)

provides that actions for relief upon the ground of mistake
must be brought within three (3) years.
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The transaction giving

rise to this lawsuit occurred on September 13, 1982, at the
closing of the real estate transaction.

Empire failed to take

any action respecting the mistake until March 23, 1987, four
and one-half years after the closing.

Clearly, all of Empire's

claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations,
and the circuit court erred in allowing Empire to prevail on
these theories.
The only possible ground upon which Empire's claims were
not barred by the applicable statute of limitations would be if
the Beneficiary Statement (Exhibit PI) or the check from Empire
to Weyerhaeuser (Exhibit P2) could be found to be the origin of
Empire's claims, thus invoking the 6-year statute of limitations
found in Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-23 for "an action upon
any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument
in writing..." The Beneficiary Statement and the check, however,
lacked the specificity necessary to form a contract.

Valcarce

v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 63, 362 P.2d 427 (1961) ("A condition
precedent to the enforcement of any contract is that there be a
meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out,
either expressly or impliedly with sufficeint definiteness to
be enforced.") quoted and reaffirmed in Pinaree v. Continental
Group of Utah, Inc.. 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976).

Further,

Wilson was not even identified on the Beneficiary Statement or
the check.

The action arose not from any writing between the
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parties, but rather as a result of mistakes made by Empire,
Wilson and Weyerhaeuser.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that the
six year statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. Section 7812-23 only applies "when the contract, obligation or liability
grows out of written instruments, not remotely or ultimately,
but immediately." (emphasis in original).

Bracklein v. Realty

Ins. Co., 95 Utah 490, 80 P.2d 471, 476 (1938), quoting O'Brien
v. King. 174 Cal. 769, 164 P. 631, 632 (Cal. 1917).

In Bracklein,

the court found an action to enforce an assumption of a mortgage
to be founded in the language of the deed requiring that the
conveyance be subject to an assumption.

Thus the obligation to

pay money in Bracklein arose directly from the written instrument.

Bracklein has been followed repeatedly, including in the

cases of Evans v. Pickett Bros. Farms, 28 Utah 2d 125, 499 P.2d
273 (1972) (Action under a written contract); and Brigham Young
University v. Paulsen Constr. Co. . 744 P.2d

1370

(Utah 1987)

(the test for determining the applicability of the 6-year statute of limitations is "[I]f the fact of liability arises or is
assumed or imposed from the instrument itself, or its recitals,
the liability is founded upon an instrument in writing") (quoting
Bracklein, 95 Utah 490, 500, 80 P.2d 471, 476).

Here, any ob-

ligation of Weyerhaeuser to repay money could not arise under
any writing since there is no writing requiring any repayment in
the event of a mistake.
14

POINT III
ASSUMING THERE WAS AN INSTRUMENT IN WRITING
JUSTIFYING A SIX-YEAR LIMITATION, EMPIRE IS
OTHERWISE PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING ITS ACTION.
Assuming, arguendo, the Beneficiary Statement constitutes
an instrument in writing extending the statute of limitations to
six years, Empire is precluded from receiving any damages by
virtue of Wilson's breach of the terms of that writing. McCarren
v. Merrill, 15 Utah 2d 179, 389 P.2d 732 (1964) (Homeowner's
failure to pay plumber, resulting in plumber's ceasing to work
on job, precluded the homeowner's claim for damages resulting
from work stoppage.); Petersen v. Intermountain Capital Corp.,
29 Utah 2d 271, 508 P.2d 536 (1973) (Demonstration of an intent
by one party to not perform the contract relieves other party
of requirement of performance.). The Beneficiary Statement provided, in clear and unequivocal terms, that "loan payments must
be brought and kept current during this escrow as loan activity
will continue."

The Beneficiary Statement further recited that

payments of $213.00 were payable on or before the first of every
month.

It was Empire's custom and practice to point this obli-

gation out to their clients. Despite this obligation, testimony
at trial revealed that neither Wilson, nor anyone acting on his
behalf, ever made any payments to Weyerhaeuser from the period
of time between September 1982 and May 1985, despite an obligation to do so.

Clearly, this long-standing failure to make

payments as provided under the contract would have excused Wey15

erhaeuser from its ultimate performance of delivering title of
the property to Wilson.

Wilson's failure to comply with the

terms of the alleged contract, evidencing the breach, justified Weyerhaeuser's refusal to perform.
POINT IV
EMPIRE WAS REQUIRED, AS A PREREQUISITE
TO ITS CLAIM, TO OFFER TO WEYERHAEUSER
THE FAIR RENTAL VALUE, OR PAST DUE MORTGAGE
PAYMENTS ON THE PREMISES INVOLVED.
The Restatement of Contracts provides:
Section 349. Necessity of Returning the Consideration Received by Plaintiff.
(1) If the plaintiff has received any interest
in land or goods or any other property in exchange
for his own performance, he cannot get judgment for
restitution in money unless promptly after knowledge
of the breach he returns or offers to return what he
has received, in substantially as good a condition as
when it was transferred to him, except as stated in
Subsection (2).
Illustration 1 of subsection 1 of the Restatement states:
1.
A contracts to sell land to B, who is at
once put in possession of the land, and makes an advance
payment of $1,000. A later tenders a conveyance that
is insufficient because of substantial defects in his
title, and B rightly refuses to accept it. B can get
judgment against A for the restitution of the* $1,000
payment, diminished by the value of the use and occupation of the land, if he promptly surrenders possession of the land after knowledge of A's breach.
Contrary to Restatement of Contracts Section 349, however,
Empire seeks a return of the $5,473.04, paid by mistake to Weyerhaeuser, without offering any compensation for Wilson's possession of the property; and without paying any mortgage pay
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ments or rental thereon from September 1982 to May 1985.

Nei-

ther Empire, Wilson nor Papworth has ever offered to compensate
Weyerhaeuser for the fair rental value of the property or for
the mortgage payments never made.

As a consequence, Empire's

claim must be reduced by the offset to which Weyerhaeuser is
entitled which, under the stipulated fair rental value of $350.00
a month at trial, would be $11,200.00.

The mortgage payments

never made, excluding late fees and additional interest, were
$6,816.00.
Comment C to Restatement of Contracts Section 349 further
requires a prompt return of the property as a prerequisite to
restitution.

It provides:

"after

[knowledge of breach] is

acquired, the retention and continued use of land, or the retention and continued use or consumption of goods, make restitution unavailable as a remedy for the breach then known to
exist."

Wilson and Papworth did not return the property to

Weyerhaeuser until after May 1985, when Weyerhaeuser requested
Papworth to leave.
POINT V
EMPIRE FAILED TO JOIN THE REAL PARTIES
IN INTEREST IN THIS ACTION, AND OTHER
PERSONS NEEDED FOR JUST ADJUDICATION.
Utah R. Civ. P. 17 and 19 set forth requirements for parties
in civil actions, generally requiring that the real parties in
interest, and those parties necessary for a just adjudication
of the controversy be brought before the court.
17

These Rules

"both seek to protect the same interests:

judicial economy and

fairness to the parties in litigation."

Kemp v. Murray, 680

P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984).

Rule 19 is to "guard against the

entry of judgment which might prejudice the rights of [indispensable parties] in their absence", and the Rule further "protects
the interests of parties who are present by precluding multiple
litigation and contradictory claims over the same subject matter
as the original litigation.

Rule 17(a) serves essentially the

same policy by requiring an action to be brought by the real
party in interest."

Id.

At the trial in this matter, Empire was unable to establish that Wilson had actually paid the original $5,473.04 which
went to Weyerhaeuser.

Empire thus has failed to prove that it

in fact holds an assignment from the party entitled to recovery
from Weyerhaeuser, if any party is entitled to such recovery.
Further, Empire did not pay all of the amount returned to Wilson
upon discovery of the mistake. Rather, Shand Morahan & Company,
Empire's errors and omissions carrier, paid approximately onethird of the settlement amount. Thus, Empire failed to establish
its entitlement to recovery of the entire $5,473.04. Without an
assignment, Empire clearly cannot pursue those monies paid by
Shand Morahan & Company.
Additionally, Empire failed to join certain persons who
may have been needed for just adjudication.
joinder of those parties if:
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Rule 19(a) requires

(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is
so situated that the disposition of the action in his
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede
his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave
any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interest.
In this case, the original seller of the property, P. Scott
Construction Company, was not made a party to the action, nor
was Papworth, the tenant in the property from September 1982
through May 1985.

P. Scott Construction Company was an indis-

pensable party by virtue of its misrepresentation or concealment
of the actual foreclosed status of the property and Papworth
should have been brought forth as an indispensable party to the
unjust enrichment claim since he, if anyone, was unjustly enriched.
POINT VI
EMPIRE FAILED TO PROVE ITS DAMAGES IN THE
COURT BELOW WITH THE SPECIFICITY REQUIRED.
In Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962),
the Utah Supreme Court has clearly precluded courts from awarding
damages based upon speculative and conjectural evidence.
principle has been repeatedly reaffirmed.

See,

The

e.g., Winsness

v. M. J. Conoco Distributors, 593 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1979) (affirming that damages based upon "mere speculation" cannot be upheld),
Bastion v. King, 661 P. 2d 953 (Utah 1983) (findings of fact
must provide a basis for determining whether there is a rational
19

basis for the award of damages).

In this case, as is set forth

in Point V above, Empire was unable to establish at trial:

(1)

that Wilson actually paid any money to Weyerhaeuser Mortgage
Company; and (2) that Empire Land Title paid all of the money
for which it seeks reimbursement, in settlement of this matter.
Empire should not have been awarded judgment in light of its
inability to meet its burden of establishing its damages.
POINT VII
THE COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES "EXPENDED
IN COLLECTING" THE JUDGMENT WAS ERRONEOUS.
Generally, attorneys' fees are only awarded where there
is a statutory or contractual basis for an award.

Arnica Mutual

Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) Petition
for Cert, filed 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March 17, 1989) (890091);
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988).

In this

case, counsel for Empire conceded at trial there was no contractual or statutory basis for an award of attorneys' fees, however,
the circuit court's judgment entered in this matter provided
"this Judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable
costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment
by execution or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit."
No contractual or statutory basis for an award of attorneys'
fees was ever asserted at trial, the circuit court's Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained no reference to such a
basis for an award of attorneys' fees, and there is, in fact,
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no basis for an award of such attorneys' fees.

Therefore, the

circuit court's judgment award of attorneys' fees in collecting
the judgment is in error, and the same should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The court below erred in failing to recognize and consider
any of the issues addressed above.
Empire, in pursuing it claims, is limited to the claims
of its assignor, Wilson.

As such, its claims were barred by

virtue of the statutes of limitation and the lapse of more than
four years from the closing of the transaction.
Furthermore, Empire's claims failed because Empire's assignor breached his obligations under any agreement which may
have existed between the parties.

Wilson's total failure to

make payments to Weyerhaeuser excused Weyerhaeuser's performance.

This failure also entitled Weyerhaeuser to demand, as a

condition of return of any refund to Empire, that Weyerhaeuser
be reimbursed for the benefit received by Wilson.

Empire failed

to do so, and thus Weyerhaeuser had no obligation to return any
funds.
Empire failed to meet its burden of proof respecting the
damages it sustained, and failed to bring indispensable parties
before the court. Finally, the award of attorneys' fees for collection as set forth in the judgment was in error and in clear
contravention of the relief sought by the parties.
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Respectfully submitted this

day of May, 1989

WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT
EMPIRE LAND TITLE, INC.,
aka EMPIRE TITLE COMPANY,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
WEYERHAEUSER MORTGAGE COMPANY,
Civil NO.

873000903CV

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
on the 17th day of November, 1988, the Honorable E. Patrick
McGuire presiding.
Robinson.

Trie Plaintiff was represented by Mark F.

The Defendant was represented by Donald Winder.

The Court having heard the testimony introduced on behalf
of the parties and being fully advised in the premises, and
having

heretofore

entered

its Findings

of Fact and

Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
1.

That Judgment is granted to the Plaintiff in the

amount of $5,473.04 together with interest at the rate of
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ten percent (10%) per annum from September 13, 1982 to the
date of Judgment and twelve (12%) percent per annum from the
date of Judgment, until paid in full and for court costs in
the amount of $48.75*
It is further ordered that this Judgment shall be
augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorneys
fees expended in collecting said Judgment by execution or
otherwise as shall be established by affidavit*
DATED this t

1989.
BY<T£H£COURT

E. PATRICK McGUIR
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Judgment and Affidavit of Court Costs to
Donald J. Winder, WINDER & HASLAM, P.C., 175 West 200 South,
Suite 4004, P.O. Box 2668, Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2668,
postage prepaid, this

\

day of Janusr^7 1989;)
Secretary ~
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IN THE 7XB.TH CIRCUIT COURT FOR CTAE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT
EMPIRE LAND TITLE, INC.,
aka EMPIRE TITLE COMPANY,

FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
WEYERHAEUSER MORTGAGE COMPANY,
Defendant.

Civil No.

873C00303CV

The above-en til lea matter came on regularly for trial
on the 17th day of November, 1980, the Honorable E. Patrick
McGuire presiding.

The Plaintiff was represented by Mark F.

Robinson. The Defendant was represented by Donald Winder.
The Court having heard the testimony introduced on behalf of
ths parties and being fully advised in the premises, now
makes

its Findings

cf Fact

and Conclusions

of Law as

fellow:'::
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing

under the laws of the State of Utah, and doing business in
Utah County, Utah.
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2.

Defendant is a mortgage company doing business in

Utah County, Utah.
3.

The

amount

prayed

for

herein

is

less

than

$10,000.00.
4.

On August

26, 1932, pursuant

to

Plaintiff's

request, Defendant .delivered a written beneficiary statement
to Plaintiff setting forth the amount of money necessary for
assumption of a mortgage loan owned and held by Weyerhaeuser
Mortgage company.
5.

By its written commitment in the Beneficiary

Statement,

Defendant

agreed

with

Plaintiff

to

allow

Plaintiff's client to assume the mortgage referred to in the
Beneficiary Statement by complying with the terms of that
statement.
6.

Plaintiff fully complied with all the terms of the

Beneficiary

Statement

by

delivering

to

Defendant

Weyerhaeuser Mortgage its check #2325 in the amount of
$5,473.04 on September 13, 1982.
7.

Defendant negotiated Plaintiff's check and kept the

funds.
8.

Defendant breached its agreement with Plaintiff by

failing to effect the assumption intended by the Beneficiary
Statement.
2

9.

On or about April 12, 1984, Plaintiff discovered

that Defendant had breached its agreement and in fact had,
on

or

about

March

26,

1982, foreclosed

intended to be assumed and had recorded

the

mortgage

a Trustee's Deed

and taken title to the property by a Trustee's Deed recorded
as Entry No. 8070, in Book 1973, at pages 75 through 77 of
the records of Utah County, Utah.
10.
to

Despite demand, Defendant has failed and refused

return

the

funds

paid

by

Empire

to

Defendant

for

assumption of the loan.
11.

Because of Defendant's failure and refusal to

return the funds paid or the assumption to Empire, Empire
has further been damaged in that it has been required to
restore those funds with interest to its escrow client and
has incurred attorney's fees and expenses in dealing with
this matter.
12.

Since September 13, 1982, Defendant Weyerhaeuser

has held, used and kept funds in the amount of $5,473.04
belonging to the Plaintiff and to which it was not entitled.
Defendant Weyerhaeuser has been unjustly enriched at the
expense of Empire Title Company and Empire is entitled to
recover its funds, with interest from the Defendant.

3
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13.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has proven the

elements in its first claim for relief and in its second
claim

for

relief.

The

Court

makes

no

finding

as

to

Plaintiff's third claim for relief.
14.

The Court finds that the defense has not proven

the element of their Counterclaim and, therefore, the same
is dismissed.
15. The Court finds that the Defendant's third defense,
Statute of limitation, does not apply and that there are
writings exhibiting agreement between the parties (Exhibits
1 and 2).

Further, the court finds that the Plaintiff

brought the Complaint in a timely manner after error was
discovered.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
16.

Judgment should be granted to the Plaintiff in the

amount of $5,473.0 4 together with interest at the rate of
ten percent (10%) per annum from September 13, 1982 to the
date of judgment and twelve percent (12%) per annum from the
date of judgment until paid in full, and court costs in the
amount of $48.75.
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17.

The terms of the Judgment should comport with the

Findings of Fact entered herein.
DATED this /%-

day of fem&fy', 1989.
BY T&E COURT:

2
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postage prepaid, this u/

day of -January, 1989/7
Secretary
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